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Globalisation represents a major challenge to governance. Indeed, for many the concept of globalisation itself is 
inextricably linked to the idea of ungovernabil- ity. This association is comprehensible, since the classic locus of 
governance is the state, and the debate on globalisation concerns mainly the allegedly declining capacity of states to 
regulate what happens within their territories as a result of their growing enmeshment in cross-border flows and 
networks.1 
This chapter does not address to what extent the governance capacity of states has been curtailed by global forces: 
other chapters in this volume assess the extensive literature on this question. Its aim is rather to review a substantial 
body of research that shows that the performance of governance functions is not limited to the actions of governments 
exercising sovereign powers over their jurisdictions, but occurs also at supranational and transnational levels. Govern- 
ance – understood as the establishment and operation of rule systems facilitating the coordination and cooperation of 
social actors – is conceptually distinct from government – understood as an organisation in charge of administering 
and enforcing those rules (Young, 1999). The literature discussed in this chapter (originating mostly from political 
scientists and international relations scholars) maintains that governance is not co-extensive with government, and that 
govern- ment should not be seen as a necessary condition of governance. More specifically, it shows that the absence 
of a world government does not mean that governance is impossible beyond the level of individual states. Global 
issues such as ozone depletion, the spread of financial crises and the prohibition of certain kinds of weapons are 
managed by governance structures that do not conform to the hierarchical model of rule-setting and enforcement that 
is typical of states. The combination of these structures can be said to form a system of global governance. 
 
What is global governance? 
 
Early uses of the term “global governance” date back to the 1970s (Mendlovitz 1975; Ruggie 1980). It was increasingly 
used in the late 1980s and early 1990s, mainly thanks to former members of the World Commission on Environment and 
Development (the “Brundtland Commission”), such as Shridath Ramphal and Maurice Strong. Several of these public 
figures participated in the Stockholm Initiative on Global Security and Governance in 1991 and then in the Commission 
on Global Governance, whose landmark report Our Global Neighborhood was published in 1995. Around the same years, 
“global governance” was introduced in academic discourses by the work of James Rosenau, Oran Young and other 
scholars. Since the 1990s, the expression has retained its dual meaning as key term of a political programme for 
international reform2 as well as a conceptual tool in political research.3 Disparate issues have been examined through 
the lens of global governance, such as the role of business in environmental policy4 the negotiation and implementation 
of public health policies,5 peace-keeping,6 gender policies,7 weapons bans,8 the regulation of world trade9 and the reform 
of the United Nations system.10 
 
Lawrence S. Finkelstein (1995, pp. 370–1) probably provided the most com- prehensive description of what global 
governance is about: 
 
Governance should be considered to cover the overlapping categories of functions performed internationally, among them: 
information creation and exchange; formula- tion and promulgation of principles and promotion of consensual knowledge affecting 
the general international order, regional orders, particular issues on the international agenda, and efforts to influence the 
domestic rules and behavior of states; good offices, conciliation, mediation, and compulsory resolution of disputes; regime 
forma- tion, tending and execution; adoption of rules, codes, and regulations; allocation of material and program resources; 
provision of technical assistance and development programs; relief, humanitarian, emergency, and disaster activities; and 
maintenance of peace and order. 
 
The complexity of this description reflects the problem of conceptualising governance with precision. The term 
‘governance’ itself has been used in a variety of contexts.11 What is common to most uses of the term ‘governance’ 
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is that it denotes a form of social steering that does not necessarily rely on hier- archy and command, as the concept 
of government implies, but also on processes of self-organisation and horizontal negotiation. In systems of 
governance, problem-solving is not the preserve of a central authority able to impose solu- tions on subordinate 
agencies and individuals, but the result of the interaction of a plurality of actors, who often have different interests, 
values, cognitive orientations and power resources.12 
 
Sceptical views on global governance 
To the extent that governance implies the possibility of ‘order without hierarchy’, it is especially relevant to the discussions 
about the management of problems in the global arena, where no supreme political authority exists. But to conceive 
the international or global system as orderly does not necessarily imply the recognition that a form of global 
governance has been established. Order is not ipso facto governance. According to the so-called ‘realist’ tradition of 
interna- tional studies, the main feature of the international system is anarchy – that is, the absence of a world 
sovereign. The international system can nonetheless be orderly, but realists hold a restrictive view of the conditions 
leading to interna- tional order. Order is said to be possible only through two mechanisms (stressed by two different 
strands within the realist tradition): the balance of power or the hegemony by one state over the rest. In the first case, 
order emerges as a by- product of alignment decisions made by states seeking survival.13 In the second case it results 
from some degree of ‘steering’ by the most powerful actor in the system.14 In both cases, order is unstable as inter-
state rivalry always threatens to disrupt economic relations and generate armed conflicts for supremacy. 
Other components of the realists’ conception of international order contribute to their scepticism towards the idea 
that global governance exists or is a concrete possibility.15 First, this tradition is interested in international order, 
understood as inter-state order. States are considered by far the most important actors in world affairs. To the 
extent that other actors have an impact on global political and economic conditions, this happens within a 
framework constituted and governed by states.16 Second, in the realist conception of international order there is 
little room for international institutions. International institutions are either irrelevant or epiphenomenal, that is, 
devoid of autonomous causal power.17 
 
Institutionalist perspectives on international governance 
To date the most elaborate response to this restrictive conception of order comes from the so-called ‘institutionalist’ 
approach to international relations. Institu- tionalist scholars generally retain realism’s emphasis on the centrality of 
states, but deny that institutions have no real role in creating and preserving orderly and cooperative relations 
between states. On the contrary, international institu- tions can affect deeply how states behave towards each other, 
and enable them to cooperate in matters where otherwise conflictual relationships would have prevailed.18 
The institutional form that has attracted more attention and study is interna- tional regimes, that is, ‘sets of 
principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue 
area of international relations’ (Krasner, 1983, p. 2). It is the pervasive presence of re- gimes that enabled several 
scholars to conclude that ‘governance without government’ is a real feature of the global system (Rosenau and 
Czempiel, 1992). 
While all institutionalists agree that international regimes do matter in inter- national politics, they disagree on the 
best way to characterise their impact. This disagreement reflects a more general divide between rationalist (‘thin’) 
and sociological (‘thick’) institutionalism in political science.19 According to the former, institutional rules operate 
as external constraints, providing incentives and information to rational actors whose preferences are exogenously 
deter- mined (or assumed for heuristic purposes). According to sociological institutionalists, on the other hand, 
institutions affect actors’ choices in a broader range of ways: by defining standards of culturally and normatively 
appropriate behaviour and common world views, they structure not only external incentives but also the basic goals 
and identities of actors. Institutions affect not only what actors can do, but also what they want to do and even who 
they are. 
These differences are reflected in the study of international regimes (Young, 1999). Rational-choice institutionalists 
in international relations theory often draw on transaction cost economics and other economic approaches, but the 
most developed theoretical framework for studying ‘cooperation under anarchy’ (Oye, 1986) derives from game theory. 
Non-cooperative game theory examines social situations in which rational actors cannot enter binding agreements and 
identifies the conditions under which cooperation is nonetheless possible (Ax- elrod, 1984). These results have been 
applied to the study of international regimes, originating a flow of theoretical and empirical work that shows how 
states – conceived as rational egoists – can benefit from an institutionalised environment when interacting with 
each other.20 
For sociologically minded regime theorists, on the other hand, the institutional environment in which states interact 
does not simply affect their strategies, but participates in shaping their identity and goals.21 Cooperation under anarchy 
is possible because states’ actions are not oriented only to ‘logics of consequences’ (rational behaviour designed to 
maximise exogenous utility) but also to ‘logics of appropriateness’ (rules, roles and identities that stipulate appropriate 
behav- iour in given situations).22 Norms have an independent causal impact on the behaviour of actors, which have 
been socialised through domestic and interna- tional learning processes. The recent wave of constructivist theorising 
presents in a different form some of the insights of the English school, which depicted the international system as 
an ‘anarchical society’ (Bull, 1977) where order is assured by a mix of power politics and common values. Insights 
from construc- tivism and English school theory have been recently been synthesised in a theory of the social structure 
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of globalisation (Buzan, 2004) 
The effects of international institutions in general and of regimes and organi- sations in particular on the behaviour 
of states are summarised in Box 19.1. 
 
From international regimes to global governance 
Regime theory has produced an impressive amount of theoretical and empirical knowledge on various aspects of 
international affairs. This body of knowledge is an indispensable foundation for the study of global governance. 
Conventional regime theory, however, tends to ignore the contribution of non-state actors to the management of 
cross-border issues. The concept of governance, on the contrary, is frequently used to convey the idea that public 
actors have no mo- nopoly over the resolution of public problems and that they increasingly collaborate with 
other actors in various stages of the policy-making process (Koenig-Archibugi, 2002, Abbott and Snidal 2009). This 
section provides an overview of the literature on the contribution of non-state actors to global governance, and focuses 
on three types of non-state actors: not-for-profit non-governmental organisations (NGOs), business entities and the staff 
of intergovernmental organisations (IGOs). 
Over the last two decades there has been a proliferation of studies on NGO participation in global public policy, which have 
examined several issue areas: human rights,23 rules of war,24 humanitarian emergencies,25gender issues,26 economic 
development,27 demography,28 health policy,29 business regulation30 and environmental protection.31 Several studies 
provide comparisons across issue areas or general reflections on public–private cooperation.32 Some go as far as 
claiming that, in the steering of global affairs, states have been joined by other actors that are ‘equally important’ 
(Rosenau, 2000, p. 187).
 
 
Box 19.1. Functions of international institutions and organizations according to institutionalist approaches 
to world politics. 
 
 
 
 
Rationalist institutionalism 
 
 
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS: 
 
provide information about common problems 
provide information about preferences 
facilitate the signalling of intentions 
constrain bargaining strategies 
provide focal points in negotiations 
facilitate tactical issue linkage 
increase the credibility of promises 
multiply interactions 
disseminate information about past behaviour 
define obligations and cheating 
define appropriate sanctions for non-compliance 
improve the monitoring of compliance 
coordinate decentralized sanctioning 
 
 
 
 
 
Sociological institutionalism 
define standard operating procedures 
stabilize routines 
generate cognitive models 
define rules of appropriate behaviour  
consolidate normative world views 
shape the formation of identities 
 
 
 
 
 
The available evidence does not support the ‘equal importance’ thesis: global public policy-making is characterised 
by conspicuous asymmetries in power and tasks, and the current balance of power (still) favours states. Having said 
that, it seems indeed indisputable that NGOs are nearly ubiquitous, having es- tablished their presence in virtually all 
international policy domains. They are 
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well entrenched in traditional areas such as development policy, humanitarian assistance and environmental 
protection, but their presence is increasing also on previously less accessible issues like finance (debt 
cancellation) and arms control (land mines). Wolfgang Reinicke and his associates (2000) showed that a 
number of important global problems are dealt with by tripartite networks, bringing together public agencies, 
business actors and advocacy groups on an informal basis. It has even been argued that ‘human rights NGOs 
are the engine for virtually every advance made by the United Nations in the field of human rights since its 
founding’ (Gaer, 1996, p. 51). 
On the other hand, presence is not necessarily influence. For instance, the authors of a comprehensive 
study of the relationship between three global social movements (environmental, labour and women’s 
movements) and three multi- lateral economic institutions (the IMF, World Bank and WTO) conclude that 
some change in the way the institutions make policy has occurred as a result of this relationship, but they add: 
‘While signalling an alteration to the method of governance, it is less clear that there is a change either in the 
content of govern- ing policies or in the broad interests they represent’ (O’Brien et al., 2000, 
p. 206). Another study, comparing NGO ‘participation’ in the UN World Confer- ences on the environment, 
human rights and women held during the 1990s, shows that NGOs were granted high visibility and access 
to many official fora, but there is little evidence that the states accepted the NGOs’ perspective on the problems 
debated. Considering moreover that access itself was conditional, the authors conclude: ‘state sovereignty sets 
the limits of global civil society’ (Clark et al., 1998, p. 35). On the other hand, a study of 23 environmental 
regimes found support for the hypothesis that the higher the degree of environmental NGO access in international 
environmental negotiations, the higher the commitment level of states, i.e. the depth of their cooperation, afterward 
(Böhmelt and Betzold 2013). As Thomas Risse (2001) noted almost two decades ago, it is no longer disputed 
that NGOs and other ‘not-for-profit’ transnational actors make a difference in world politics: now the 
interesting question is: why, and under what conditions? 
 
With regard to the role of the business actors in the management of cross- border activities and exchanges, 
several recent studies demonstrate that this is significant. Some sceptics hold that ‘International firms create 
the need for improved international governance, but they do not and cannot provide it’ (Grant, 1997, p. 319), but 
other researchers have shown that, in many areas, business actors have established transnational regimes that 
give order and predictability to the massive flow of transactions that takes place across state borders. A major 
study on global business regulation finds that in all the sectors considered ‘state regulation follows industry self-
regulatory practice more than the reverse, though the reverse is also very important’ (Braithwaite and Drahos, 
2000, p. 481). Other researchers have highlighted several regimes whose members are mainly or exclusively 
private actors.33 These transnational regimes overlap with and some- times are functional equivalents of the 
international regimes established by governments. In addition, business actors – that is, interest associations or 
power- ful corporations – participate regularly in the international policy-making process, and in many 
cases have a decisive influence on the outcomes.34 
 
 
Conventional regime analysis tends to neglect not only non-state actors such as NGOs and companies, but 
also international organisations as organisations. Most institutionalist analyses focus on the operation and 
effectiveness of re- gimes, which are not actors in their own right and affect outcomes only by influencing 
the behaviour of members and others subject to their provisions. In comparison, less attention has been paid 
to intergovernmental organisations, which are often at the centre of a regime and which in principle are capable 
of agency. 
In the past few years a number of studies have advanced interesting hypotheses about the goals, functions 
and power of IGOs, which can provide a theoretical foundation for further empirical research.35 Case studies 
of multilateral negotiations have already highlighted the active role of the bu- reaucrats who staff international 
organisations, showing that they are able to exercise influence by forging strategic alliances, sponsoring 
research, mobilising technical expertise, raising public awareness and playing a leadership role in 
negotiations.36 This involves a certain degree of operational autonomy, that is, the officials’ capacity to act 
independently of their ‘principals’ – namely, the governments that have collectively delegated functions to 
them. 
In sum, the management of global affairs is not the preserve of governments, but involves a broad range of 
actors, at the domestic and transnational levels. Specifically, global governance implies that firms and NGOs 
are not simply the passive recipients of the rules negotiated by governments above their heads, but participate 
in various ways in the formulation of those rules through public– private partnerships, or even by establishing 
purely private regimes to regulate certain domains in their common interest. Therefore, actor pluralism should 
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be added to the possibility of non-hierarchical order and the role of institutions as a defining characteristic of 
global governance. 
Some of the most interesting and innovative research on global governance in recent years tackles one or 
more of following three themes. First, researchers are increasingly interested in the “performance” of global 
governance institutions and its determinants.37 For instance, while some of the authors cited earlier focused on 
organizational pathologies deriving from the bureaucratic elements of IOs, Ranjit Lall (2017) argues that the 
main obstacle to performance is the propensity of governments to use IOs to promote narrow interests rather 
than broader organizational objectives. Second, a strand of research shows that the (variously defined) 
performance of global governance institutions is decisively influenced by their ability to foster high-quality 
deliberation among the main stakeholders.38 Third, scholars are increasingly focusing on the architecture of 
global governance as a whole, or at least in particular policy domains, rather than individual actors or 
institutions. Compared to ten years ago, we know much more about the causes of institutional fragmentation 
in global governance, as well as its impact on policy effectiveness and the distribution of the benefits and costs 
of governance.39 The increased attention to the distributional implications of global governance goes hand in 
hand with a deeper understanding of the rising political contestation of global governance institutions.40         
 
 
 
Normative perspectives on global governance 
This chapter had focused on analytical and empirical work on global govern- ance, but normative approaches 
to the problem deserve at least a brief mention. The legitimacy of global governance can be assessed from a 
variety of perspec- tives, most of which are based on the commitment to democracy as an essential condition 
for the legitimisation of political orders.41 Roughly two main positions can be distinguished: democratic inter-
governmentalism and democratic cosmopolitanism. 
According to democratic inter-governmentalism, global governance cannot receive direct democratic 
legitimisation, but must obtain its legitimacy indirectly through the participation of democratically elected 
governments in global policy- making42 In this view, democracy requires a public sphere, and no transnational 
public sphere exists now or is in sight. There are at least two formidable obstacles to the formation of a public 
sphere beyond the nation state, one cognitive and one affective. On the one hand, democratic deliberation is 
impossible when de facto the majority of people are excluded from global networks of political com- munication, 
notably because of insufficient foreign language skills. Deliberation in supranational fora would be monopolised 
by educated elites and therefore remain undemocratic. On the other hand, the acceptance of the results of collec- 
tive and possibly majoritarian decisions requires a degree of solidarity and sense of common belonging that is 
extremely weak beyond the national level. 
According to democratic cosmopolitanism, democratic legitimacy can and should be conferred through 
multiple channels, in a pattern that corresponds to the pluralistic character of global governance. Moreover, 
the democratisation of international institutions itself can extend the focus of concern and loyalty of 
individuals and groups beyond the national dimension, and for this reason democratic restructuring should be 
conceived as a dialectical process of mutual reinforcement. Cosmopolitan institutions (such as a global assembly 
of peoples and forceful international tribunals) will enhance the effectiveness of global public policy-making 
by increasing its legitimacy and at the same time they will promote domestic democracy.43 
Debating the normative strengths and benefits of different models of global governance is important 
because, while the establishment of a genuinely demo- cratic system of global governance may be unlikely in 
the near future, there is little reason to believe that it is impossible.44 
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